

MR. NIXON

A Hard Look At The Candidate

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■ THE SEEMINGLY endless search for the "real" Richard Nixon has been a popular sport of American pundits since 1948. As with the hunt for Jack the Ripper, the quarry has proved brilliantly elusive yet quadrennially captivating to the imagination. Every four years, by the time the snow falls in New Hampshire, Mr. Nixon returns to the political scene as certainly as the recurring legend of the Ripper lives on in the wary step of the London shopgirl. Who is he? Why does he do it? In the answers to these questions are the secrets that prolong the legends.

I

THE NIXON STORY is one that begins almost as if it had been written by Horatio Alger. Reared in a hard-working Quaker family, Richard Milhous Nixon was early inspired by his father's commitment to overcoming economic hardship through diligent effort. As the former Vice President has said, "My dad was an individual—he'd go to his grave

before he took government help. This attitude of his gave us pride." And, no doubt it did. The schoolboy Nixon worked in the family's small grocery store until nine or ten o'clock at night, and after-hours would study until two or three in the morning.

In Nixon's junior year in high school, in keeping with his Quaker philosophy of individual responsibility and personal dignity, young Nixon's father gave him complete charge of the vegetable counter in the family grocery store. Dick did the buying, driving to the Los Angeles public market before sunrise to haggle with the local produce growers, then hurried back to arrange his displays before leaving for school. All the profit he could make was his, and all that he could save went into a college bank account. It was superb training for any boy.

A good student of aggressive nature, Nixon became entranced with debating in high school. His debate coach, Mrs. Clifford Vincent, remembers that she used to feel "disturbed" at his superiority over his teammates. "He had this ability," she said, "to kind of slide around an argument instead of meeting it head on, and he could take any side of a debate."* His teenage skill at debating may have been honed by his six weeks as a barker for a wheel of chance at the Slipper Gulch Rodeo in Prescott, Arizona. There "he learned the knack of drumming up customers and then letting them have it," writes Phillip Andrews in *This Man Nixon*. "His

*William Costello, *The Facts About Nixon*, Viking Press, New York, 1960.

booth, it is said, became the most popular one in the show."

While working his way through Whittier College, Richard Nixon majored in history and again covered himself with distinction as a debater and also as an actor in school dramas. Dr. Albert Upton, who directed Nixon in one of the Whittier College plays, is still awed when he recalls how adept the young collegian was at producing tears. "It was beautifully done, those tears," he remembers, confessing to having "twinged" when he saw photos of Nixon weeping on Senator William Knowland's shoulder after the famous "Checkers" speech. Dr. Upton says he never dreamed that his former student would go into politics, but adds: "I wouldn't have been surprised if, after college, he had gone on to New York or Hollywood looking for a job as an actor."

During all four years in college, the youthful Nixon doggedly went out for football. Though he never got beyond the bench, being possessed of two left feet, he nevertheless refused to give up. His coach, Wallace Newman, recalls the weeks that would go by without Nixon's ever playing a minute, but says he was nonetheless "wonderful for morale, because he'd sit there and cheer. . . . To sit on the bench for the better part of four seasons isn't easy."

According to Earl Mazo, his most friendly biographer, "Nixon classified himself a 'Liberal' in college, 'but not a flaming liberal.' Like many law students of that period, his public heroes were Justices Brandeis, Cardozo and Hughes, then the Supreme Court's progressive minority."* At Duke Law School on scholarship, he graduated third in his class. Stewart Alsop quotes a former classmate: "My impression was that Richard Nixon was not an exceptionally brilliant student. However, he

was outstanding because of his ability to do prodigious amounts of work. He pursued his ambition to stand at the head of his class with an intensity that few people are capable of."

Upon graduation Nixon was nonetheless turned down by several Wall Street firms and, curiously, by the F.B.I. Shaken, he accepted a job in the bureaucracy of Washington, D.C., then served in the Navy during World War II. Mr. Nixon described his war record in the famous "Checkers" speech of 1952 in these words:

My service record was not a particularly unusual one. I went to the South Pacific. I guess I'm entitled to a couple of battle stars. I got a couple of letters of commendation, but I was just there when the bombs were falling, and then I returned.

That isn't just how it was. In fact, Stewart Alsop notes in *Nixon and Rockefeller* that "... Nixon had a non-combat job far from the battle lines. . . ." For a few weeks, though, his naval unit was on the fringes of a combat area. And, while he received a citation for being efficient in providing supplies—something he had been doing effectively with cabbages and parsley since the age of seventeen—he was certainly entitled to no battle stars.

Home from the South Pacific, Nixon began his political career as a protege of a group of businessmen who were so anxious to defeat Leftist Congressman Jerry Voorhis in 1946 that they had run an advertisement in a local newspaper to seek prospective candidates. Friends in Whittier, no doubt regaled by Nixon's war stories of bombs bursting in air, suggested that he answer the ad and run for Congress.

Up to then, Richard Nixon says he had little interest in politics, but he accepted the offer with alacrity: "Why did I take it? I'm a pessimist, but if I figure

*Earl Mazo, *Richard Nixon*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1959.



Richard Nixon discusses his "war record" in the nationally televised "Checkers" speech of 1952.

I've got a chance, I'll fight for it." As the acid Stewart Alsop observes: "Nixon became a politician, in short, more because it seemed a good idea at the time than because of any profound political convictions. Having thus entered politics more or less by accident, one suspects that he thought of a political career much as another young veteran back from the wars might think of advertising, or meat packing, or bond selling—as a way to make a living and get ahead."

Young Mr. Nixon, campaigning in his Navy uniform, won that first election against great odds, using a strategy described by biographer William Costello: "... Nixon, canvassing the 200,000 voters of the district, introduced himself as a 'liberal Republican.' He refrained from attacking the New Deal in all its aspects, but he pulled no punches in attacking Voorhis."

II

IT WAS the Hiss case in 1948 which rocketed the young California Congress-

man to the headlines. Although the actual investigation of Alger Hiss was done by Robert Stripling of the staff of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, it was Nixon's persistence which finally nailed Hiss as a Soviet spy. The Hiss case had its origin in testimony given by Whittaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, of which Mr. Nixon was a member. Nixon recalled later that Chambers "made charges which at the time seemed fantastic—that he'd been a Communist, that he had worked with Hiss, White, Abt, Pressman, Witt, and a group of others who were also connected with the government."

Alger Hiss, of course, was a very important man. He had long served with the State Department, was instrumental at the founding of the United Nations, and had since become President of the powerful and prestigious Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hiss promptly came before the Committee to deny all. "He was an

amazingly impressive witness the first time," Nixon said later. "I would say that ninety percent of those who were in the committee room were convinced that Mr. Hiss was telling the truth . . . when he said that he did not know Mr. Chambers." The case was almost dropped.

Of course, Chambers too was a man of some standing, one of six senior editors of *Time* magazine, but Hiss had a phenomenal record in government service and came before the Committee not as a confessed ex-Communist, like Chambers, but as a man of redoubtable credentials. Nonetheless, and to his eternal credit, Congressman Richard Nixon took the lead in urging further investigation.

Hiss helped seal his own doom by suing Chambers for calling him a Communist. Now under pressure, Whittaker Chambers produced a thick envelope containing four pages in Hiss' handwriting and a number of typewritten documents which he said had been copied on Alger Hiss' typewriter. He charged the envelope contained confidential State Documents which Hiss had pilfered and passed on to him in the service of the International Communist Conspiracy. Examination showed the papers were in fact copies of authentic top-secret documents; and, other testimony established that the transmission to the Russians of verbatim texts of these papers would have enabled the Soviet government to break the State Department's secret code.

So powerful were the Communists in government that, even in the face of all of this, there was an intimation from the Justice Department that the Hiss-Chambers case would be dropped unless additional evidence could be found. At that point Mr. Nixon performed his penultimate service in the Hiss case. At a private interview with Chambers on the latter's farm in Maryland, Congressman Nixon learned that

Chambers had in his possession additional documentary evidence. The next evening, in a cloak-and-dagger scene that fired the national imagination, an agent of the Committee served a subpoena on the ex-Communist, Chambers led him in darkness to a pumpkin in his garden, and from the pumpkin he drew five rolls of microfilm containing photostatic copies of confidential and secret documents stolen from the State Department.

A New York Grand Jury, on the verge of indicting Whittaker Chambers for perjury, reversed itself when Nixon rushed to New York and testified that it must have been Hiss who lied in saying he had not turned official documents over to Chambers. Simultaneously, the F.B.I. was able to establish that the pumpkin papers, and letters from Mrs. Priscilla Hiss, had been typed on the same Woodstock typewriter. On December fifteenth, the Grand Jury climaxed its investigation by bringing in an indictment of perjury against Alger Hiss, who was later found guilty and jailed.

For his role in exposing Hiss, Richard Nixon earned the undying hatred of a vast segment of the American Left. Hiss had been a fair-haired boy among the "Liberals." Adlai Stevenson and Dean Acheson had served as character witnesses at his trial, and many another "Superliberal" had gone out on a limb to defend him. Until Nixon's persistent investigation produced the evidence, the dapper and urbane Hiss was on his way to being cleared. Nixon left a lot of "Liberal" Democrats with egg on their faces, but he concluded the experience as a national hero.

In 1950, Congressman Nixon emerged victorious in a vicious campaign in California to defeat extremist Helen Gahagan Douglas for a vacated seat in the U.S. Senate, capitalizing on the considerable reputation he had earned as an anti-Communist in dogged pursuit of Alger Hiss. Nixon Red-baited

the "Pink Lady" unmercifully, if quite correctly, and introduced some interesting campaign techniques no doubt remembered from the midway of the Slipper Gulch Rodeo. For anyone who answered the phone to Nixon's canvasses with the words, "Vote for Nixon," there would be, "PRIZES GALORE!!! Electric clocks, Silex coffeemakers with heating units — General Electric automatic toasters — silver salt and pepper shakers, sugar and creamer sets, candy and butter dishes *etc., etc.*" Nixon also sent every registered Democrat in the state a handbill which began: "As one Democrat to another. . . ." Yet another handbill, featuring a smiling photo of the Republican candidate, began: "Fellow Democrats . . .!"

Political success seemed only to stimulate Mr. Nixon's ambitions. Senator Robert Taft, for one, described him as "a little man in a big hurry." He *was* in a hurry, all right. And he played his cards carefully. Although Nixon had built a considerable reputation as an anti-Communist in the Hiss affair, and as sponsor of the Mundt-Nixon Subversives Control Bill, the Californian had also been careful to remain a vigorous internationalist.

The individual most responsible for Nixon being confirmed as Dwight Eisenhower's running mate in 1952 was apparently Paul Hoffman,* the man who was instrumental in making the Leftist policies of the Ford Foundation what they are today, a trustee of the Communist Institute for Pacific Relations, and member of Americans United for World Government. At a meeting to pick a running mate for Eisenhower, the Leftist Mr. Hoffman, as chief spokesman for the Citizens for Eisenhower movement, was most persuasive. As he said later: "I told them everything I had heard about Senator Nixon was

good. I looked on him as one of the Republicans who had an enlightened view of foreign affairs, and I thought that a man of his views should run with General Eisenhower."

Nixon, you see, had moved quickly to become a fair-haired boy to the Republican "Liberals" through his efforts in behalf of an organization known as Republican Advance. It had been easy to see that 1952 would be a pivotal year in American history and that the Republican Party was virtually a cinch to regain control of the White House.



The Nixon family: Tricia, Julia, Richard, and Pat.

The Truman scandals, the Korean War, Communist infiltration of government, the fact that for the first time since 1932 the G.O.P. was not faced with an incumbent President — all these factors combined to make the Republican nomination tantamount to election. Nixon knew that the Left was thus fiercely determined that the nomination not fall to conservative Robert Taft, but to one of their own. He joined the effort.

Russell Davenport, a devout "Liberal" Democrat who had successfully run

*See *Biographical Dictionary of the Left* by Francis X. Gannon, American Opinion, Boston, \$1.00.

the campaign to sell fellow Democrat Wendell Willkie to the Republican Party in 1940, and who had later been a founder of the A.D.A., served as the organizing force behind the Far Left's move to set up the Republican Advance movement. Working with Davenport were Hoffman, Nelson Rockefeller, and Sidney Weinberg.*

Advance made its first public move on July 4, 1950, when twenty-one Republican Congressmen joined what they termed a "revolt" against the Taft wing of the Party. It was they who publicly proclaimed the formation of Republican Advance, launched in semi-secrecy the previous week with the announced purpose of destroying Taft. An Advance manifesto was quickly issued to supplant a G.O.P. declaration of policy adopted in February of 1950 by House and Senate Republicans, and concurred in by the Republican National Committee. The official Republican statement had dared to declare that the election issue would be "liberty versus socialism." Republican Advance advocated playing down the issues of socialism and anti-Communism and stressing "positive" programs in the fields of collectivist legislation — in other words, to out-"Liberal" the Democrats. As the manifesto declared: "The real issue against the Democrats *does not lie with the goals. . . .*"

The move was on to shift the Republican Party from one which advocated repealing socialism to one promising to run socialism in an efficient and businesslike manner. By taking the heat off the socialists and Communists, Leftist inroads into the American Republic were consolidated and assured bi-partisan support. Now, here's the key: According to the *Los Angeles Times* of July 14, 1959, one of the founders of Republican Advance, later

re-named Citizens for Eisenhower, was Richard M. Nixon.

III

AT THE BEGINNING of the 1952 election campaign Nixon swore he would make Communist subversion and corruption the theme of every speech. "If the record itself smears," he said, "let it smear. If the dry rot of corruption and Communism, which has eaten deep into our body politic during the past seven years, can only be chopped off with a hatchet — then let's call for a hatchet." The words were aimed at the many discouraged supporters of Senator Taft, and were designed to get them back into the 1952 campaign. Even the "Liberals" saw through the ploy. As "Liberal" columnist Stewart Alsop wrote at the time: "The admiration for Nixon among the Taft-worshippers is essentially irrational, since Nixon contributed to Taft's last defeat in 1952, and since he has none of Taft's hankering for a simpler past." Still, the ploy worked.

In his new job as President of the Senate, Vice President Nixon labored vigilantly to implement even the most Leftist features of the Eisenhower program. In an article in *Colliers* for October of 1965, entitled "How Ike Saved the G.O.P." (by purging conservatives), Paul Hoffman noted:

In the Senate from the very beginning the President's program had the unqualified and vigorous support of Vice President Nixon. Some liberal Republicans are unconvinced as to the Vice President's attitude, holding that he has supported the program only out of personal loyalty to the President. That his original ultra-conservative views are changed. Based on what Nixon has said both publicly and privately, it is my view that he genuinely and deeply believes that the full Eisenhower program is best for the country.

*Weinberg, who served as chief money raiser for Eisenhower in 1952-1956, is this year raising \$3 million for the campaign of Hubert Humphrey.



Nixon is shown in 1959 as he welcomes Khrushchev, the Butcher of Budapest, to the United States.

Vice President Nixon, a one-time supporter of Senator Joseph McCarthy, now worked vigorously to carry out the directives of Ike's so-called Palace Guard (Paul Hoffman, Sidney Weinberg, and C. D. Jackson) to silence the Wisconsin Senator whose investigations were flushing top conspirators from the government. "Liberal" White House correspondent William Costello even credits Nixon with having "persuaded McCarthy to call off his threat to investigate the CIA," and having "talked McCarthy out of keeping J. B. Matthews as chief investigator [of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]" Matthews, one of the most knowledgeable experts in the United States on Communist subversion, had made the mistake of writing a magazine article documenting the activities of subversives inside the National Council of Churches.

While Communism in the government was a good campaign issue, you see, Costello says that once the election was over Nixon "tried to guide McCar-

thy away from the whole Communist issue, telling him that he would benefit by broadening his field of activity." Nixon's role as an Eisenhower henchman is further described in *The Facts About Nixon* as follows:

Although Nixon's original undertaking as a middle-man applied primarily to the McCarthy investigations, and although Eisenhower refrained from giving him any formal status as a deputy leader of the Administration, his talents as a legislative broker were invoked from time to time on a variety of problems. In the first weeks of the Administration, the President ran into trouble on the confirmation of two key ambassadorial appointees — Boblen to go to Moscow and Conant to Bonn. In both cases, it was Nixon who reassured the edgy right-wingers. . . . Again, it was Nixon who during the Congress got Senator Pat McCarran to call off a filibuster on the immigration bill, and persuaded

Dan Reed of the House Ways and Means Committee to swallow the President's tax program after giving vent to violent rumbles of discontent.

Ignoring bleeding Hungary, a Communist takeover in Cuba, the loss of the Suez Canal, the Korean stalemate, a major recession, the gold drain, increased taxes, and all-time-high peacetime budget deficits, Nixon said that Eisenhower had "the best eight-year record of any Administration in the history of this country." Washington, Lincoln, Madison, and Jefferson, please take note.

Memory of the Hiss affair and Nixon's hard-fought campaigns, however, still rankled uninformed "Liberals," and Nixon was doing his best to create a new image—to come out as the "new Nixon." By 1958, columnist Doris Fleenon would write of him: "Having now 'matured,' he earnestly repents and is heartily sorry for the kind of campaigns he waged for the House and Senate against then-Representative Jerry Voorhis and Helen Gahagan Douglas respectively." Those, of course, were Nixon's anti-Communist campaigns.

Stewart Alsop says of this "new Nixon": "He wanted to be President very much, and he knew that he had a chance, perhaps a good chance, to become President. But he also knew—for he is anything but a fool—that a reputation as an extremist and partisan would sharply reduce that chance. Hence his change of political style. A man's motives are always mixed, and no doubt it is true that Nixon changed his political style after 1954 in part for purely practical political reasons."

In October 1956, "the new Nixon" told an audience at Cornell University that investigations of Communist activities, such as those formerly conducted by Senator Joseph McCarthy, were no longer needed. Associated Press of October 17, 1956 says he gave credit to

the Eisenhower Administration's security policies for taking "this issue . . . out of the political arena." Four days earlier Nixon had explained in Rock Island, Illinois, just how the Eisenhower Administration had cleaned the security risks out of government. "The present security program," he said, had "resulted in 6,926 individuals being removed from the federal service." This was quickly contradicted by Phillip Young, Eisenhower's Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, who testified that he knew of no single government employee who had been fired by the Eisenhower Administration for being a Communist or fellow-traveler.*

As 1960 approached and "the new Nixon" was to have his own shot at the Presidency, he announced that the Communist threat had all but disappeared. Late in 1959, Nixon claimed: "Domestic Communism is no longer a political issue. The danger has receded a great deal in the last few years, domestically, mainly because we have become increasingly aware of it. The Communists used to fool an awful lot of well-meaning people who were not Communists."

IV

RICHARD NIXON felt more than ready in 1960 to step up to the Presidency. His

*After promising to investigate the Communists in "every department," Eisenhower let stand an Executive Order issued by President Truman in 1947, which prohibited Congress from access to government files on the loyalty of personnel. Another 1948 directive by Mr. Truman, forbidding government officials to give information to Congressional Committees without White House permission, was also left standing by Eisenhower.

On Friday, May 17, 1954, Eisenhower issued an order stopping the supply of any information on administrative departments to investigating committees, which went far beyond the Truman "gag" rule. Chairman Francis Walters of the House Committee on Un-American Activities called this Eisenhower Executive Order "incredibly stupid." Congressional Committees were now, for all practical purposes, out of the business of investigating Communists and other subversives in the government—in complete repudiation of Eisenhower's campaign promises.

only serious rival for the candidacy was Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York. Rockefeller had run hard, but Nixon, a tireless campaigner for the Republican candidates across the country, was well in control of the Convention. When Rockefeller found he could not lay claim to the actual nomination, he moved to dictate policy from behind the scenes. A meeting was thus arranged between Nixon and Rockefeller for the Saturday before the Republican Convention opened in Chicago.

In *The Making of the President*, 1960, Theodore White notes that Nixon accepted all the Rockefeller terms for this meeting, including provisions "that Nixon telephone Rockefeller personally with his request for a meeting; that they meet at the Rockefeller apartment . . . that their meeting be secret and later be announced in a press release from the Governor, not Nixon; that the meeting be clearly announced as taking place at the Vice President's request; that the statement of policy issuing from it be long, detailed, inclusive, not a summary communique."^{*}

As a result of the meeting, a four-way telephone circuit was set up linking Rockefeller protege Charles Percy (Chairman of the Republican Platform Committee), a second Rockefeller deputy in Chicago, Nixon, and Rockefeller. What finally emerged were the fourteen points of the famous Compact of Fifth Avenue.

The Republican Platform Committee had been meeting in Chicago for an entire week, laboriously pounding out a platform reflecting the views of Republicans from all fifty states. Now the Platform Committee was handed the Rockefeller-Nixon orders: Forget the effort and the time you have spent to come to Chicago at your own expense, hear witnesses, and draft a document to

submit to the Convention—throw it all out and accept the Rockefeller-Nixon platform worked out, in secret, 830 miles from the Convention site. The "Liberals" were ecstatic; here was their kind of democracy in action!

The *Wall Street Journal* of July 25, 1960, claimed that the Fifth Avenue meeting was not a Rockefeller coup but a Nixon victory; that Nixon had needed a rationalization for dumping the Party conservatives. As a result of the meeting, the *Journal* states, "a little band of conservatives within the party, of whom



"Kennedy and I agree on most of the issues. . . ."

Senator Goldwater is symbol and spokesman, are shoved to the sidelines. . . . First impressions to the contrary, Mr. Nixon has achieved all this without giving Mr. Rockefeller a single important concession he did not want to make.

"This is not to deny that the fourteen points are very liberal indeed; they comprise a platform akin in many ways to the Democratic platform and they are a far cry from the things that conservative men think the Republican party ought to stand for. . . .

^{*}Theodore White, *The Making of the President*, 1960, Atheneum Publishers, New York, 1961, Page 196.

"But as you go down the fourteen points, one by one, it's clear they reflect the Nixon brand of liberalism. . . .

"Actually, Mr. Nixon has rather skillfully used the Rockefeller meeting to get a few liberal planks into the platform which he already wanted but which he was having trouble getting through the platform committee. . . .

"Thus it is that in one burst of speed Richard Nixon has accomplished three maneuvers — defied the conservative wing of the party, cut loose from President Eisenhower and neatly outflanked his major opponent within the party. . . . Mr. Nixon's risk is that conservative voters will be outraged enough to stay away from the polls and that his liberal gesture will not in fact gain any liberal votes from the Democrats. . . .

"In doing so he has moved the Republican party a little more to the left on the political spectrum, a thing that is bound to be sad not only to men of conservative mind, but also to those who would like to see the philosophy differences that divide the country sharpened into clear political issues. Once more we are going to be deprived of that kind of a choice in a presidential election.

"As a matter of tactics, Mr. Nixon with this platform abandons the deep South and conservatives everywhere to whatever they can make of the Democratic platform."

Another *Wall Street Journal* article of the same day concluded that the Rockefeller-Nixon agreement "brings the spotlight shining once more on a facet of his public image he has long labored to eradicate; that of 'Tricky Dick,' the politician who sacrifices principle to expediency."

The *Chicago Tribune* headlined the Nixon-Rockefeller meeting as "Grant Surrenders to Lee." The Welfare platform dictated by Rockefeller and Nixon, which included an endorsement of the objectives of Communist-led sit-ins in the South, was called by Senator Gold-

water "the Munich of the Republican Party."

Republicans everywhere understood the meaning and significance of the new Rockefeller-Nixon alliance. Nixon had purged himself of his independence to become acceptable to the *Insiders* of the International Left. As Theodore White put it:

Never had the quadrennial liberal swoop of the regulars been more nakedly dramatized than by the open compact of Fifth Avenue. Whatever honor they might have been able to carry from their services on the platform committee had been wiped out. A single night's meeting of the two men in a millionaire's triplex apartment in Babylon-by-the-Hudson, eight hundred and thirty miles away, was about to overrule them; they were exposed as clowns for all the world to see.

Nixon confirmed his alliance by accepting as his running mate one of the foremost darlings of the internationalist clique, a discredited instigator of the smear-Taft maneuver of 1952 and of the anti-McCarthy smear of 1954, Henry Cabot Lodge. Cabot Lodge then proceeded to virtually sit out the campaign. *Newsweek* of March 23, 1964 phrased it more delicately: "His laziness became legend."

That there was a deal of monstrous proportions is beyond question. In analyzing Nixon's acceptance speech at the Republican Convention, the *Wall Street Journal* of August 1, 1960, noted:

He does not reject any particular Federal activity — whether it be Federal medical help for the aged, Federal aid to education, or Federal foreign aid — on the ideological ground that it is something the central government has no right to do.

Of course, Nixon did throw a bone to the dejected conservatives, proclaiming in his acceptance speech: "The only answer to a strategy of victory for the Communist world is the strategy of victory for the free world." But, as the *Journal* commented, "Exactly what Mr. Nixon has in mind in this regard will have to await clarification." That clarification never came.

In the 1960 campaign Nixon attempted a feat more difficult than passing a camel through the eye of a needle. He tried to outpromise the Democrats. *Newsweek* of July 11, 1960 quoted him as saying: "... We are not going to be outbid. . . . We can reach goals the so-called economic liberals of the Galbraith-Schlesinger school can never reach. We can show that we can produce better schools, hospitals, health, higher living standards." Wow! And Nixon knew what he was doing. He was now advocating *more* of the very same policies he had once denounced so vociferously as socialist and Communist. The *Wall Street Journal* even headlined an article for July 29, 1960: "Nixon Aims to Wed Fiscal Responsibility to Welfare State." As the *Journal* explained:

... the Republican party this year stands on a platform that borrows much from this modern liberalism. In the area of civil rights, and welfare legislation, in the acceptance of big Government spending, the Republican party is once more seeking to meet the Democratic party on its own ground. . . .

Mr. Nixon is going to completely ignore any distinction between conservatives and liberals in wide political areas. . . .

He will accept it as proper for the Government to intervene in the nation's business, to take on for the people some of the obligations which were once left to them individually

—the path is straight from social security to socialized medical care. In that sense the Roosevelt revolution is complete; Mr. Nixon, if elected, will not dismantle the welfare state.

The only difference the *Journal* could find between the Democrats and Republicans was that the Democrats promised socialism through deficit spending while the Nixon Republicans promised socialism with balanced budgets. Either way, America was to be the loser.

In his campaign against Senator John Kennedy, Richard Nixon regularly pulled his punches. He never discussed what informed Republicans considered his best issue: the Senate records of Kennedy and Johnson — including Senator Kennedy's sponsorship of legislation to repeal the loyalty oath provision of the National Defense Education Act, his vigorous support of Communist revolutionaries in Algeria, and his backing of the repeal of the Battle Act provision which prohibited the sending of strategic materials to Iron Curtain countries. And, Nixon never even mentioned Mr. Johnson's killing of the bill to restore to the states the right to punish subversion.

Instead, like Willkie and Dewey before him, Richard Nixon conducted a campaign using the orthodox "New York strategy," concentrating his efforts on the big cities at the expense of rural areas, the West, and the South. Nixon failed as Willkie and Dewey had failed before him: He simply could not wedge the "Liberal" East and conservative West into a single phalanx. The principal irony of Mr. Nixon's campaign was that he could very probably have won every state he did win without any effort to project a "new Nixon." And, had he not turned Left, he might have picked up in the South the votes he needed to become President.

Yes, it was very ironic indeed.

V

ACCORDING to his most authoritative biographer, Earl Mazo, Richard Nixon personally "considers himself a 'radical' when it comes to the goals he would set for the country (his definition of 'radical' being the 'opposite of conservative')." This has become more and more evident.

In his oft-used phrases about relying on the private sector and the free enterprise system, Nixon is simply supporting with clichés that which he does not really understand. In economic matters, the *Wall Street Journal* of April 27, 1959 reports, Richard Nixon is "... trying to avoid getting obsessed with the idea [of balancing the budget]. He believes the real issue is not a balanced budget so much as the danger of inflation." Since deficits beget inflation, this is like being for motherhood but against children. When asked by *U.S. News & World Report* how to cure an economic slump, Vice President Nixon betrayed his ignorance of the market economy by answering:

... We should have "in the bank" a great number of tested and proven public-works projects on which some of the preliminary planning work has been done. . . . I believe we should have a host of such projects which could be put into motion in the event the economy needed a shot in the arm. (August 29, 1952.)

Of course, Nixon should know that the economy can be "given a shot in the arm" only when a government with a balanced budget reduces *spending and taxes* so that the taxpayers can buy more goods and services. When a government increases the spending, and hence the taxes, it merely spends the money that consumers would have chosen to spend themselves. It is thus, in the macro-economic sense, mere tommyrot to increase the political giveaway and ex-

pand the role of government to try to ease economic difficulties.

Since his first term in Congress, Nixon has also been an active advocate of giving away our wealth to foreign countries, and of fighting perpetual-wars-for-perpetual-peace. "Liberal" columnist Stewart Alsop says admiringly of Nixon: "He is an internationalist, an activist, and interventionist . . . in foreign policy." And, that is quite true. While a member of the Herter Committee, Nixon even helped to write the report that paved the way for the great giveaways following World War II. At a news conference in Baltimore in 1958, he defended American aid for Communist Poland and added:

I challenge anybody who has a more consistent record in the field of foreign aid, starting with the Greek-Turkish loan, going through the Marshall Plan, and making speech after speech for foreign aid two years ago during the budget fight when very few people were for it.

Nixon's one-world proclivities are, alas, notorious. Although he has always been clever enough never to openly join the dangerous United World Federalists (U.F.W.), he has sponsored several pieces of their legislation in Congress. For example, the U.F.W. magazine, *World Government News* for October 1948 (Page 14), noted that "Richard Nixon: Introduced world government resolution (HCR 68) 1947, and ABC (World Government) resolution 1948." *World Government News* of May 1951 (Pp. 8-9) lists Nixon as sponsoring on January 15, 1951, a resolution "which calls for U.S. initiative towards a federal union of democracies." This was the infamous Atlantic Union Resolution and was co-sponsored by such "Liberal" extremists as William Fulbright, Hubert Humphrey, Estes Kefauver, and Herbert Lehman.



Stewart Alsop: "There are in fact no sharp ideological differences between Rockefeller and Nixon."

The Atlantic Union Committee, whose Resolution Mr. Nixon sponsored, was set up by socialist Clarence Streit to advocate federal union with Western Europe as a first step on the road to world government. Pollster Elmo Roper, in his book *The Goal is Government of All the World*, explains that: "Some of us *who have been interested in World Government for several years* now have come together to form the Atlantic Union Committee."

When queried by angry conservatives on how he could sponsor the Atlantic Union Resolution after having taken an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States, Mr. Nixon has vehemently claimed that the Resolution really has nothing to do with world government and that it only provides for a "federal convention to explore . . . within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free world union." Of course, if Richard Nixon was really opposed to world government, he would hardly have called over and over again for a convention

which its promoters say is aimed at surrendering our independence and making the United States one region in the new federal nation of Atlantica.

Another standard bail-out used by Nixon when confronted with his activities on behalf of the international Left is to say that he does not believe a World State is practical at this time, but that it will be in the future. While the proposed federal union with the N.A.T.O. nations is (as he says) not total world government, it has always been claimed by the Federal Unionists that such total world government is their goal—for the future. In a brochure called "Eight Reasons Why Atlantic Union Will Benefit You Now," issued in the 1950s when Nixon was sponsoring their Resolution in the Senate, President of the Atlantic Union Committee Owen J. Roberts declared:

Our ultimate goal is world federation, but the way to start is with those civilized people who recognize individual liberty under law. The door

will be kept wide open for all freedom-loving peoples to come in. . . . It will be the first step towards government of all the world.

The latest Atlantic Union bill was introduced in Congress by Republican Paul Findley of Illinois, who inserted into the *Congressional Record* letters of support which he had received from prominent Republicans. In his letter of endorsement to Findley, Nixon wrote: "As Clarence Streit probably told you I have supported this resolution for many years and I wish you every success in your effort." (*Freedom and Union*, March 1966, Page 9.)

The United World Federalists' slogan is "World Peace Through World Law." The *New York Times* of April 15, 1959 editorially congratulated Nixon for his "important and far-reaching proposal" to "elevate the International Court of Justice at the Hague to a real Supreme Court of the world with far wider jurisdiction and . . . power to make binding decisions. . . ." Nixon has repeatedly urged the repeal of the Connally Reservation, which now prevents the World Court from having sovereignty over American domestic affairs.

An even more important key to preserving the sovereignty of the United States was the Bricker Amendment, forbidding the President to surrender to any international body those freedoms guaranteed to American citizens by the Constitution. This attempt to preserve basic American liberties was described by "Liberals" as "tying the hands of the President in dealing in foreign affairs," and "undermining the treaty-making power of the President." Nixon had originally supported the Bricker Amendment. But, when he joined the Eisenhower team, that all changed.

In his biography of Nixon, William Costello notes:

The Bricker Amendment, in turn,

called for Nixon's best talents. The White House set itself adamantly against the amendment's proposed limitation on the President's treaty making powers, and it was Nixon who brought the report that sentiment both in and out of Congress was more sympathetic to Bricker than the President had supposed. The Vice President, after first proposing compromise, found himself in loyalty to the White House stalling, placating, instructing, and negotiating, and finally joining Eisenhower in opposition to Bricker's demand.

Thanks to Nixon's failure to stand firm, the Bricker Amendment did not pass, despite the fact that no one has yet adequately explained *why* any President should *want* to give away any of the rights guaranteed to American citizens by our Constitution — a Constitution which every federal officer has sworn to defend.

It is, you see, to the field of foreign affairs that Nixon has devoted his primary Leftist efforts. As "Liberal" authors David Broder and Stephen Hess say in their book, *The Republican Establishment*,* "One senses that Nixon really does not have his heart in domestic questions. His most carefully considered speeches are on foreign policy." Now, here's the point: In the *Wall Street Journal* of April 27, 1959, Nixon calls himself "a liberal rather than a conservative because I have an international view . . . of foreign policy."

It was biographer Earl Mazo who wrote of Nixon's foreign policy views as far back as 1959: "He is the administration's—and perhaps the nation's—leading advocate of Big Aid over Big Guns. 'In the next ten years our greatest external danger will not be military, but economic and ideological,' Nixon insists.

*David Broder and Stephen Hess, *The Republican Establishment*, Harper and Row, New York, 1967.

Therefore, he believes, it is more important to provide money for people-to-people and cultural-exchange programs than for missiles and submarines. "If we have to choose in allocating funds between military programs and the economic, information and other non-military programs, I would put the emphasis on the non-military programs and take a gamble on the military programs."

To handle serious conflict, Nixon advocates a strong U.N. army to supersede American military independence. As the *Los Angeles Examiner* reported on October 28, 1950:

A strong effort to obtain approval of his resolution calling for establishment of a United Nations police force will be made by Congressman Richard Nixon when Congress reconvenes November 27th, the California Senatorial nominee said today. . . . Nixon's resolution suggests that a UN police authority be set up on a permanent basis, to consist of land, sea and air forces. It would swing into action against aggression under decision of a simple majority vote of the police authority.

Realizing that this was from the "old 'conservative' Nixon," and that the Communists control that "simple majority" he was talking about, one begins to wonder just how far "the new Nixon" can move to the Left without announcing support for Mao Tse-tung. Well, he has made a good beginning by announcing his admiration for Secretary of State Dean Rusk. On March 10, 1968, in New Hampshire, Mr. Nixon told the *New York Times*: "I think Dean Rusk would be an excellent Secretary of State under a President who had a better understanding of foreign policy. He's a gutsy guy and a fine, professional diplomat."

Rusk, of course, was a key member of the Institute of Pacific Relations which

the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee says "has been considered by the Communist Party and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and military intelligence." The work of the I.P.R. was largely responsible for the sell-out of Chiang Kai-shek to the Chinese Reds, and Dean Rusk was one of the "China hands" who played an important role in that disaster. In March of 1950, Dean Acheson named Rusk as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. While holding that position Secretary Rusk even delivered a speech in praise of the Chinese Communists in which he described the Peking Reds as revolutionaries comparable to the American patriots of 1776, and declared that the course of their agrarian reform was "not Russian in essence." Nixon's "gutsy" friend Dean Rusk was also instrumental in shaping those policies of the Korean War which General Douglas MacArthur described as "a catastrophic blow to the hopes of the Free World," including the policy of giving the Communist Chinese a privileged sanctuary north and west of the Yalu River.

Mr. Nixon's expression of admiration for Rusk provides a clue to the type of man Nixon would appoint as Secretary of State if he is elected President. One now begins to realize why Goldwater, shortly after the 1960 election, referred to Nixon as a "worse appeaser than Neville Chamberlain." (Joseph Alsop, *San Francisco Examiner*, November 29, 1963.)

That word *appeaser* is a bitter and prejudicial one. Let us simply say that—despite fifty years of proofs to the contrary—Nixon has always been a strong believer that negotiations with the Communists can be meaningful and fruitful. He has argued that once the Communist conspirators "understand the rules and are willing to have them fairly enforced by an impartial umpire" [the World Court] then the United States

and the Communists can engage in "peaceful competition, knowing that both systems would be moving in the direction of a world of peace..." In his book, *The Challenges We Face*, Nixon writes: "The alternative—to have no negotiations—would mean, obviously, that we would lessen our chances of achieving agreements with the Communists...."

Nixon, who supports cultural exchange programs with the Soviet Union despite thoroughly substantiated protests from J. Edgar Hoover that such programs are a front for Red spies, supported bringing Nikita Khrushchev, the Butcher of Budapest, to the United States in 1959. The invitation to Premier Khrushchev, who had been responsible for the deliberate starvation of millions in the Ukraine, served to tell the enslaved peoples behind the Iron Curtain that America was no longer interested in their plight; that we had decided to co-exist with their masters. Speaking in London in November of 1958, the Vice President said the Free World should "speak less of the threat of Communism and . . . adopt as our primary objective *not* the defeat of Communism, but the victory of plenty over want, of health over disease, of freedom over tyranny." Premier Khrushchev declared it a "welcome statement." (Mazo, Page 205.)

Nixon even participated in several "debates" with the Butcher of Budapest, including this incredible response to Nikita's bragging about the accomplishments of Communism: "There are some instances where you may be ahead of us: for example, in the thrust of your rockets for the investigation of outer space. There may be some instances in which we are ahead of you — in color television, for instance."

When the Vice President arrived in Moscow on his "goodwill trip" in 1959, he went so far as to apologize to Khrushchev for the resolution recently

passed by Congress commemorating "Captive Nations Week" which demanded that the United States continue its efforts to win the release of the "Captive Nations." Nixon told Khrushchev, "this was a foolish resolution."

Not only does the former Vice President support acceptance of a Communist Central Europe, but he even opposes quarantining Mao's China, butcher of more than 25 million Chinese and exporter of revolution to all Asia. Nixon said in Hong Kong on August 11, 1966: "There is a great desire on the part of the American people to improve relations with Communist China." In closing his speech, Mr. Nixon declared: "At this time the problem is not that the United States has isolated China, but that Communist China is isolating itself." As in making war against Thailand, Burma, India, Tibet, Laos, and Indonesia, and supplying war materiel to kill American soldiers in Vietnam, and aiding Reds in Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Angola...?

Some isolation!

Just where Nixon stands in regard to the Vietnam War — the key international issue at the moment — has been most difficult to assess. Hess and Broder say in *The Republican Establishment*:

With respect to the Johnson Administration, while Nixon has endorsed the American commitment in Vietnam and the President's statements of America's purpose there, he has been steadily critical of the actual conduct of the war. (Page 192.)

At this writing, Mr. Nixon supports the major fallacy of a "no-win" policy and aid and trade with the East European arsenal of the Communist enemy killing our soldiers in the field, but leaves open the door of criticism just enough to make political capital out of the war.

Many conservatives have speculated

that Richard Nixon's dangerously Leftist attitudes on foreign policy are a product of his close association with the extremist Council on Foreign Relations. At one time Nixon readily admitted in letters to his constituents that he was a member of the international Left's Council on Foreign Relations. Since the C.F.R. has been exposed, and come under considerable criticism from conservatives, the former Vice President now engages in a great deal of double-talk whenever the subject is broached. He has even tried to pass off the C.F.R. as merely an "advisory body" to which he belonged in order to obtain their magazine, *Foreign Affairs*. The C.F.R. itself boasts that it is far more than an advisory body, and in fact leads the way in creating American foreign policy; as for the magazine, it is certainly not necessary to be a member of C.F.R. to receive *Foreign Affairs*.

Human Events of March 23, 1968, reports that Nixon dropped out of the Council on Foreign Relations in the early Sixties. The C.F.R., however, admits that many of its most important members are forced, in effect, to "go underground." Nixon has never repudiated nor attacked the C.F.R. nor its policy of seeking U.S. convergence with the Soviet Union and aid and trade with the Communist bloc supplying the Vietcong.

Although supposedly not a member of the Council on Foreign Relations at this time, Mr. Nixon recently authored an article for the 45th Anniversary issue of the C.F.R.'s magazine, *Foreign Affairs*. The article, in the number for October 1967, is entitled: "Asia After Vietnam." In it Mr. Nixon speaks of "the evolution of a new world order" based on "regional approaches to development needs." The former Vice President suggests that "an appropriate foundation stone" on which to build such a regional defense pact is the Asian and Pacific Council. And, according to

Mr. Nixon, "its members have voiced strong feelings that . . . it should not be made 'a body to promote anti-Communist campaigns.'" In other words, the organization which Mr. Nixon recommends to defend Asia against Communist aggression is not even anti-Communist!

Also in that article, Nixon again stressed his belief that: "We simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations. . . ." His solution to the continuous aggression of Communist China, even as it supports Communist North Vietnam in the killing of American soldiers, is a giant Marshall Plan of foreign aid for all Asia: ". . . We have to find ways to engineer an escape from privation for those now living in mass poverty. There can be no security, whatever our nuclear stockpiles, in a world of boiling resentment and magnified envy. The oceans provide no sanctuary for the rich, no barrier behind which we can hide our abundance." Incredibly, Mr. Nixon was issuing a Marxist call to share the wealth — not only in America, but in the entire world. Surely he is not unaware that the amount of money that it would require to permanently raise the standard of living for Asia's billion people by any appreciable amount would strip America bare.

VI

IN DOMESTIC POLITICS, Richard Nixon has built a reputation for supporting Republicans of whatever ideological stripe. At the Hershey Conference of 1964, he declared: "I want all Republicans to win; I am just as strong for a liberal Republican in New York as I am a conservative Republican in Texas, and I can go on and just as enthusiastically campaign for both, because we need both liberals and conservatives to have a majority."

As early as 1958, Mr. Nixon had begun to argue vigorously in favor of

making "Liberals" as well as conservatives feel at home in the Republican ranks, thus breaking with those who fought to keep the Republican Party devoted to its historic conservative principles. No Republican is too far to the Left for Nixon. As far back as 1954, he even campaigned for Senator Clifford Case of New Jersey, who was running for re-election and accurately accused by his opponents of "being soft on Communism." Biographer Mazo reports that: "No candidate got more vigorous support from Nixon than the liberal, frankly anti-McCarthy Senator Case. . . Case was elected by only 3,200 votes. Without Nixon's help he would have lost."

Time magazine of December 22, 1967 notes that Nixon even attended a recent Manhattan fund-raising dinner for New York's "Liberal" Senator Jacob Javits. "While Rockefeller and New York Mayor John Lindsay listened with fixed smiles," says *Time*, "Nixon warmly endorsed Javits for re-election next year." A Republican by accident, Javits is like Nixon a supporter of the United World Federalists. He has a nearly perfect A.D.A. voting record.*

Nixon also supports "ultra-Liberal" Republican John Lindsay, giving him this warm endorsement: "John Lindsay is the best political property to appear on the national scene in years. . . . John . . . should run as an independent . . . I am interested in his winning . . . I will help him in any way. . . ." (*Los Angeles Times*, October 18, 1965.)

Nixon has not been nearly so friendly in supporting conservative candidates. Biographer Costello describes Nixon's strategy for the G.O.P. :

In defiance of the Taft thesis, he brushed off the protests of reactionary conservative Congressmen, on the theory that they come mostly from rock-ribbed Republican districts where they would win as a matter of course. If by this tactic he drove ultra-conservatives away from the polls, he considered that a part of the price he had to pay to broaden the popularist image of the party. So reckless were his tactics that by 1959 members of the Republican National Committee admitted in effect that the party's position had reverted to what it was eight years before. . . . the party organization, with Nixon generally acknowledged as its effective operating head, had fallen to pieces as a result of the tactics that had been pursued.

In 1962, Mr. Nixon went to California to run for the governorship of the state. This was a calculated and brutal blow to conservative Assemblyman Joe Shell, who had been campaigning for many months before Nixon entered the race. Before launching his campaign, Shell had checked with Nixon to see if he was interested in the job, and was told by Nixon that he had no intention of running for the governorship of California. Subsequently, Shell was telephoned by Nelson Rockefeller to see in whose corner Shell would be at the 1964 Republican Convention. The conservative Shell informed Rockefeller that he would not support the New York Governor. Soon thereafter, Shell received a call from Rockefeller's office announcing that Richard Nixon was leaving New York and coming to California to run for Governor. Nixon, who was much more widely known to the voters, defeated Shell in the primary.

Richard Nixon's campaign against the bumbling Pat Brown, whom even many Democrats believed to be an oaf, was one of the most incredible in polit-

*According to testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee by the Communist Party's former political leader in New York, Dr. Bella V. Dodd, she was ordered by the Party to help get Javits started in politics. She advised Javits, a Democrat, to re-register as a Republican and entered him in a race where the Democratic Party was badly split.

ical history — especially in light of the fact that Nixon prides himself on being a shrewd campaigner. Instead of turning his guns on Brown, who had been described by *Time* magazine as a "tower of jelly," the former Vice President campaigned against the apolitical but anti-Communist John Birch Society. Nixon, who has regularly campaigned for such "ultra-Liberals" as Jacob Javits, John Lindsay, Clifford Case, and Edward Brooke, repeatedly called for the political liquidation of conservative Republican Congressmen John Rousselot and Edgar Hiestand. In fact, Nixon, the great uniter of the Republican Party, refused to appear on the same stand with either of the two incumbent conservative Congressmen because they were members of The John Birch Society.

The other prong of Nixon's "fighting campaign" was directed against Proposition 24, a statewide initiative to outlaw the Communist Party. The initiative had been carefully drafted by a committee of Constitutional lawyers so as to protect legitimate civil rights and avoid conflict with Supreme Court decisions. Half a million voters had signed petitions to put this anti-subversion measure on the ballot. As the *Oakland Tribune* of October 29, 1962, remarked:

Every such law, even if perfectly written, is challenged and subjected to court test. . . . This will undoubtedly happen again, and if Proposition 24 has faulty sections, they will be eliminated by court action. . . . On the other hand, the measure contains certain provisions that are vitally needed.

The Communists, of course, were screaming bloody murder about Proposition 24, as were Governor Pat Brown and his comrades. Amazingly, Nixon offended half a million voters by also coming out against it. To top the mat-

ter, the Brown Administration was highly vulnerable on the issue of Communism — an issue which Nixon had used so successfully against Voorhis and Mrs. Douglas. Mr. Nixon not only refused to use it but prohibited distribution of a former F.B.I. counterspy's devastating expose of the Red-infested California Democratic Council.

Richard Nixon's bitter, down-in-the-mouth, lackluster campaign astonished both his supporters and his enemies. What they did not know was that Nixon had no heart for the battle, since he no more wanted to be Governor of California than he wanted to be Emperor of the Hottentots. He had everything to lose in California and nothing to gain. Having lost to John Kennedy by a hairsbreadth was nothing to be ashamed of, but a loss in California would make him a two-time loser. On the other hand — well, Nixon was literally in debt to Rockefeller.

While the former Vice President was playing "Liberal" and losing by over 300,000 votes, Dr. Max Rafferty, an avowed conservative who refused to compromise on his conservative principles, was winning his campaign for the key post of Superintendent of Public Instruction in California by nearly a quarter of a million votes. This despite the fact that Rafferty's all-out "Liberal" opponent had the hundred percent support of the Brown Administration, union leaders, the California Democratic Clubs, the California Teachers Association, the State Board of Education, California's powerful campus Left, and all the Democrat organizations in the state.

At the beginning of his campaign the polls had showed that Nixon was ahead by the landslide margin of fifty-three percent to thirty-seven percent for Brown. But, by gearing his campaign not against Pat Brown and his Spendthrift Administration, but against Proposition 24 and conservative Republicans

and anti-Communists, Nixon — like Dewey in 1948—snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. Four years later Ronald Reagan, a political amateur who had never before stood for public office—running as a conservative—dispatched Pat Brown to his political Valhalla by a million votes, making Nixon's performance all the more obvious.

Still, as the 1964 election approached, the old firehorse Nixon began to smell the perfumed smoke of the White House once again. Since the catastrophe of 1962, he had lain back, bided his time, and avoided the stop-Goldwater movement until late in the game. Then, as "Liberals" Hess and Broder report with approval:

Just as suddenly, Nixon switched sides and became the self-appointed leader of the stop-Goldwater forces. A week after California had voted, on June 9th, he flew to Cleveland for the national Governors Conference. . . . Nixon . . . astounded everyone by attacking Goldwater at a press conference. Citing the Senator's view of the United Nations and Soviet-American relations, his suggestion that social security be made voluntary, that the Tennessee Valley Authority be sold to private interests, and civil rights enforcement be left to the states, and a national right-to-work law be enacted, Nixon said, "It would be a tragedy for the Republican party in the event that Senator Goldwater's views, as previously stated, were not challenged and repudiated." (Pp. 168-169.)

Nixon was trying to set up Romney as a stalking horse in a last desperate effort to produce a Convention deadlock from which he, Nixon, would emerge as the nominee. Seeing that this strategy would not work, the former Vice President changed directions once again:

. . . privately, the last two weeks of June, 1964, Nixon began to readjust his sights from the 1964 nomination to the 1968. . . . Nixon evolved a new role for himself: the apostle of party unity who would campaign doggedly for the ticket in 1964 and for all Republican candidates in 1966, as a way of rebuilding his political capital for 1968. (Hess and Broder, Page 170.)

Nixon believed that Goldwater was "doomed to defeat," but he nevertheless campaigned tirelessly for the Arizonan knowing that by doing so he would make himself appear to be the only possible candidate in 1968 who would not divide the Party, as most other Republican leaders were engendering rank-and-file bitterness by sitting out the campaign. One week after the 1964 election, Nixon told Warren Duffee of United Press International that the Republican Party had "gone too far right" and now "most of all needs some discipline." Nixon continued: "The Republican party's national position must represent the respectable and responsible right and the responsible ultra-liberal." The future position of the G.O.P., Nixon said, "must be the center. . . . The formula [for victory] should be the Eisenhower-Nixon formula, not because it is more to the left, but because it is the right position. . . ."

Nixon placed himself squarely in the "center," but failed to comment on the fact that the middle of the road has been moving Left for thirty-five years.

VII

IN HIS QUEST for the 1968 nomination, Richard Nixon has assumed that conservatives have nowhere else to go and has consistently courted the "Liberals." By attending the funeral of "Civil Rights" agitator Martin Luther King, along with virtually every other presidential office seeker and black national-

ist, Nixon made it clear that he was still willing to crawl for a bloc vote. With his vast contacts, Nixon certainly had access to the information in the F.B.I. file on King, which fully discloses King's close association with the Communists.

Two former presidents of the American Bar Association called the Civil Rights Bill of 1964 "ten percent civil rights and ninety percent federal power grab." Nixon, who called it a "great step forward," even capitalized on the hysteria following Dr. Martin Luther King's death to help push another "Civil Rights" bill through Congress.

According to the *Los Angeles Times* of March 24, 1968, Mr. Nixon had been working behind the scenes to support forced-housing provisions in the new bill even before King's assassination. *Human Events* noted that after the killing Nixon played a strategic role in getting Congress to adopt the hastily drawn 1968 Civil Rights Act. He not only pressed for adoption of the "open housing" section, which had never undergone proper Committee Hearings, but urged House Republicans to accept the Senate version of the Civil Rights bill *without alteration*. Such Nixon lieutenants as Representative Clark MacGregor of Minnesota helped to persuade House Republicans to accept the Senate amendments in toto. Nixon's call to Representative John Anderson of Illinois, swing man on the important House Rules Committee, turned out to be a crucial move for the fate of the Senate bill. As *Human Events* noted:

The rules committee had appeared deadlocked over whether to send the Senate bill to a Senate-House conference, where House members could rework the legislation, or to send the bill to the House floor for a vote with a gag rule that would prevent any amendment whatsoever. Nixon phoned Anderson and urged him to

send the bill to the House floor for a quick vote. Under pressure from Nixon and the tense conditions in the country following the murder of King, Anderson buckled.

The *Insiders* and their puppets know that during the psychological shock of a disaster the public is willing to accept measures which would not otherwise be adopted.

In order to capture Negro support in his 1968 quest for the presidential nomination, Nixon has even formed an alliance with the revolutionary black power fanatics of the Congress of Racial Equality. C.O.R.E. has adopted the forty-year-old Communist cry for a separate Black Nation and its retiring chairman, Floyd McKissick (a violent Marxist who has led C.O.R.E. in officially repudiating non-violence) advocates a complete redistribution of the wealth beginning with the government subsidization of certain Negro business enterprises. This has been mislabeled "Black Capitalism" and is a subtle perversion of the only honest answer to economic difficulty — the genuine free enterprise system. On May 29, 1968, columnists Evans and Novak reported:

In recent days, Nixon has been in contact with CORE leaders Floyd McKissick and Roy Innis (McKissick's successor) through intermediaries. Thus, their surprising agreement on economic black power could turn out to be Nixon's first real breakthrough into the Negro leadership.

Subsequently, C.O.R.E. came out in praise of Nixon for having seen "the relevance of black power" and claimed that Richard Nixon is the "only Presidential candidate who is moving in the direction of CORE's program."

What the fanatics of C.O.R.E. are advocating is not the channeling of pri-

vate capital into Negro-owned businesses, but non-profit co-ops which will be financed by government loans. Tax-free, non-profit co-ops, financed by the taxpayers, do not constitute capitalism. What Nixon mistakenly calls "Black Capitalism" is in reality the creation of Black Communes or Black Soviets.

In a further quest to attract support of Leftist Negroes, says *Parade* magazine of June 16, 1968, Nixon has considered naming Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts as his running mate. However, Brooke decided to throw in his lot with Nelson Rockefeller. "Liberal" columnist Carl Rowan, who served in important capacities with the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, reported that leftward forces in Massachusetts "regard Brooke as one of their own, infiltrating the enemy camp—and making them like it. They regard [this] as a contest to see whether an ideological Democrat can go all the way to the top in a Republican masquerade."

One of the great puppet shows of 1968 has been the Nixon-Rockefeller contest. Many an astute observer believes that Rockefeller may have entered the Presidential race at a time when he had little chance of winning, only to bring some badly needed publicity to the Republican Party's efforts and to solidify conservatives behind Nixon. The Rockefeller announcement that Nixon would be ideal as Rocky's running mate tends to support this view. At the very least, Nelson Rockefeller will have tremendous bargaining power with Nixon and would be the power behind the throne in a Nixon Administration. As Stewart Alsop writes in his book, *Nixon and Rockefeller*:

There are in fact, it should be noted, no sharp ideological differences between Rockefeller and Nixon, as there were between Dewey and Taft and Eisenhower and Taft. When Rockefeller worked in Wash-

ington for the first Eisenhower Administration, he often found an ally in Nixon on such issues as foreign aid. The difference is really a difference of style and background and approach to politics. . . .

Nixon's friend and biographer, Earl Mazo, says that in Washington, "Nixon and Rockefeller became good friends and supported each other consistently. . . ." After the 1956 election, Rockefeller wrote to Nixon on November seventh that "...under you and the President the Republican party is now emerging, at home and abroad, as the great liberal party of the future." (Mazo, Page 186.)

The Nixon-Rockefeller alliance is so solid that when Nixon moved from California to New York following his defeat for the governorship of California in 1962, he was delighted to become a tenant in the Rockefeller-owned apartment building in which Nelson Rockefeller lives.

In discussing Nixon's financial situation, authors Hess and Broder note:

... His chauffeur drives him home to a ten-room cooperative apartment on Fifth Avenue . . . the venerable building comes one apartment to the floor and the tenants include Nelson Rockefeller and William Randolph Hearst, Jr. It cost Nixon about \$100,000 [and he must pay] a yearly maintenance fee of \$9,600 to live there. . . .

When he left government at the age of 48, his net worth was about \$50,000, mostly in the equity of his Washington home and his Federal Employees Insurance Plan.

Of course, a pension plan is a non-liquid asset. And, as a matter of fact, Nixon had just left California with unpaid bills from his gubernatorial campaign. Where does the money come from? Certainly Mr. Nixon doesn't spend

much of his time practising law. For lengthy periods of each year he has toured the globe on personal fact-finding junkets. For other parts of each year he has stumped the United States, restoring his credentials as a political leader. Where *does* the money for all this come from? The fact is that Nixon is paid \$200,000 a year for "practising law" by a firm of international lawyers which sophisticated New Yorkers say gets much of its business from Rockefeller interests around the world. His standing is undoubtedly worth \$200,000 a year to the firm.

Rocky's speech writer, Emmett John Hughes, has written that Rockefeller believes Nixon to be less than bright. But Nixon has been, and can continue to be, useful to Nelson Rockefeller—and Rocky knows it. Richard Nixon may even personally despise the New York Governor after suffering humiliation in 1960 and 1962 because of him, but money talks and Richard Nixon has always wanted, and never before had, money.

VIII

THE SEARCH for the "real Nixon" continues. In an apparently introspective mood the former Vice President told Stewart Alsop, "The more you stay in this kind of job, the more you realize that a public figure, a major public figure, is a lonely man. . . You can't talk too much about your personal plans, your personal feelings. I believe in keeping my own counsel. It's something like wearing clothing — if you let your hair down, you feel too naked." Then Nixon added: "Any kind of personal confession is embarrassing to me generally. I can discuss issues, general subjects. I have fun playing poker, being with friends. But any letting down of my hair, I find that embarrassing."

When the interview was nearly completed, Alsop said, "Well, I've taken up a lot of your time already. Thanks very

much — it's been really interesting."

Out of the clear sky Nixon then volunteered: "You know I try to be candid with newspapermen, but I can't really let my hair down with anyone."

"Not even with old friends?"

"No," admitted Nixon, "Not really with anyone. Not even with my family."

Does anyone know the "real Nixon"? Even his family? Probably not. The sad flaw in his character is that he has tried to be all things to all people at all times. No one is quite sure what, if any, principles he sincerely holds. Theodore White, in *The Making of The President, 1960*, says he believes Nixon lost the presidency in 1960 precisely because he had no visible set of principles, and that "...Nixon was above all a friend seeker, almost pathetic in his eagerness to be liked."

A clue to what motivates the real Richard Nixon is given by "Liberals" Hess and Broder:

For Nixon, the end is power — specifically the incomparable power of the Presidency. He moved toward it in a spectacular, meteoric career; Congressman at 33, important Congressman at 35, Vice President at 39, only two-term Republican Vice President at 43, Presidential nominee at 47.

The English historian Lord Acton has noted that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. It may indeed be one of the great tragedies of our time that this man, who might have gone down as one of the truly great men in American history, was — precisely as Senator Robert Taft observed—in too big a hurry. Of course, the final chapters are not written and we cannot yet close the book on Richard Milhous Nixon. Certainly the next few months will tell a great deal more about him. We hope to one day be able to write a much happier end to this biography. ■ ■

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